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When  Schumpeter  asserted  that  there  are  only  two  “fundamentally  different  groups  of 
Business  Cycle  theories”  he  undoubtedly  had  the  then  current  formal  theories  in  mind,  which 
allowed  for  only  damped  (monotonic  or  oscillating)  behavior  on  one  hand  and  explosive 
(monotonic  or  oscillating)  behavior  on  the  other,  with  a  border  between  the  damped  and  the 
explosive.  In one  common  form  this  border  required  that  the accelerator  coefficient  equal  one 
for  the  generation  of  a  constant  amplitude  (non  damped,  non-explosive)  cycle  (Hicks,  1950; 
Minsky,  1959). 
Schumpeter,  in his obituary  of Mitchell,  associated  his own position  with Mitchell  in holding 
that  “cycles  are the form  of capitalist  evolution”.  Schumpeter’s  Kitchen,  Juglar,  and  Kondratiev 
cycles  reflected  his  views  that  there  are  a  number  of  facets  to  the  generation  of  economic 
evolution,  and  that  these  cycles,  along  with their  synchronization  one  to the other,  reflected  the 
special  economic  factors  that  were involved  in the generation  of  a particular  type  of cycle.  To 
Schumpeter  Kitchen  cycles  were  mainly  inventory  and  investment  cycles,  Juglar  cycles  were 
investment  cycles  with  monetary  or financial  market  involvement,  and  Kondratiev  cycles  were 
the  result  of  the  rise  and  then  decline  of  the  exploitation  of  major  technological  innovations. 
Great  depressions,  such  as that of  the  193Os, occurred  when  the low  points  of  Kitchen,  Juglar, 
and  Kondratiev  cycles  coincided.  In  this  paper  we  integrate  the  intertemporal  behavior  of 
profits,  investment,  indebtedness,  and  interest  rates:  we are  modeling  what  Schumpeter  would 
have considered  Juglar cycles  (Schumpeter,  1939). 
Even  as we agree with  Schumpeter  in holding  that cycles  are the form  of capitalist  dynamics 
and evolution,  we differ  with him:  we expand  the alternative  intertemporal  behaviors  to three.  It 
is  not  necessary  for  the  interactions  of  economic  variables  through  time  to  yield  either  a  non- 
oscillatory  time  series  or  a  wavelike  motion.  The  endogenously  determined  path  through 
calendar  time of the complexly  interrelated  sets of markets  of  a capitalist  economy  can  take  the 
form  not only  of non-oscillatory  time se&s  and wavelike  motions,  but in addition  it can become 
incoherent.  The  incoherence  of  runaway  inflations  and  debt  deflations  are  facts  of  economic 
history.  In general  it is accepted  that incoherent  behavior  of the economy  has dire consequences, and  in  modem  economies  incipient  or  realized  incoherence  will  lead  to  governmental 
interventions.  These  governmental  interventions  can  be  by  the  government,  strictly  speaking,  or 
by  a  “semi-independent”  central  bank.  We  can  now  visualize  a  third  set  of  business  cycle 
theories  in  which  cycles  result  from  the  combination  of  endogenous  interactions  that  can  lead  to 
incoherence  and  the  impact  of  institutions  and  interventions  that 
towards  incoherence. 
We  note  immediately  that  this  third  set  of  models  finds 
aim  to  contain  these  thrusts 
that  government  sponsored 
institutions  and  government  interventions  can  play  a  positive  role,  in  that,  if  well  used,  they 
contain  the  degenerative  tendencies  of  capitalist  economies  (Ferri  and  Minsky,  1991).  We  need 
but  recall  that  the  capitalism  of  the  winter  of  1932-33  was  a rather  complete  failure,  and  that  the 
capitalism  of  the  main  capitalist  economies  was  quite  successful  in  the  first  quarter  century  after 
World  War  II. 
The  starting  point  of  our  extension  of  Schumpeter’s  insight  is  the  linear  accelerator 
multiplier  model,  which  had  a run  during  the  1940’s  and  50’s and  then  faded  from  the  scene  as 
growth  theory  replaced  cycle  theory  as  a  focus  of  research.  In  the  Hicks-Hansen-Samuelson 
linear  accelerator  multiplier  model,  the  path  through  time  of  the  system  depended  upon  an 
accelerator  coefficient  that  linked  investment  demand  to  the  change  in  income  and  a 
consumption  coefficient--the  marginal  propensity  to  consume--that  linked  consumption  to 
income.  The  accelerator  was  taken  to  be  a  technical  attribute  of  the  economy,  and  the 
consumption  coefficient  was  taken  to  be a deep-rooted  psychological  law. l 
In  a  series  of  exercises,  Minsky  explored  the  properties  of  an  accelerator-multiplier  setup 
where  the  values  of  the  accelerator  and  multiplier  generated  explosive  time  series.  These 
explosive  time  series  were  constrained  by  floors  and  ceilings,  which  broke  the  ongoing  process 
and  established  a  new  process  with  new  initial  conditions.2  In  one  article  (Minsky  1957a), 
ceilings  and  floors  were  determined  by the’behavior  of  the  monetary  system,  i.e.,  an  aspect  of  the 
institutional  structure,  which,  by  setting  limits  on  the  acquisition  of  assets  by the  banking  system, 
determined  the  maximum  rates  of investment  and  disinvestment. Because  the power  of computers  enables  us to discover  aspects  of the characteristics  of  time 
series  that  are generated  by mathematically  non-tractable  systems,  we can  set up our  analytical 
structure without  being unduly  concerned  with mathematical  tractability  of the resulting  model. 
Schumpeter’s assertion,  which  we use as a motto, reflected  the state of knowledge  at the time 
he was writing.  Today’s knowledge  enables  us to a take a third approach,  in which  the complex 
structure  of  an economy  yields  time  series  that  can  generate  smooth  growth  and  well-behaved 
cycles  as possible  transitory  results  of the economic  process,  but that also allows  for intermittent 
conditions  conducive  to the emergence  of incoherence  or turbulence.  Such emerging  incoherent 
or turbulent  behavior  results  from  the cumulative  effect  of the ordinary  behavior  of the agents  of 
the economy  upon  variables  that affect  the behavior  of  the economy.  In the early  stages  of  the 
process  these  cumulating  variables  are  not  a  significant  influence  on  the  qualitative 
characteristics  of  the  time  series  that  are  generated:  their  effect  is,  so  to  speak,  suppressed. 
However,  when  the cumulative  changes  pass  some thresholds,  qualitative  changes  occur  in  the 
economy’s performance. 
In  Section  2  some  principles  underlying  the  formulation  are  presented.  In  Section  3  we 
discuss  the  impact  of  institutions  upon  the  behavior  of  the  processes  that  generate  our  time 
series.  In our argument,  institutions  can act as the equivalent  of circuit  breakers.  If the system  is 
very  turbulent,  then  the  time  series  actually  generated  can  be  dominated  by  the  impact  of 
institutional  characteristics  that set maximas  and minimas  to variables.  In Section  4 the model  is 
presented.  We  go  over  the  9  equations  that  make  up  our  rather  simple  extension  of  the 
accelerator  multiplier  model.  In Section  5 we examine  the reduced  form equations.  In Sections 
4 and 5 references  are made to a series of figures that illustrate  the equations  and the simulations 
of  the  model.  Section  6  draws  out  some  implications 
progress. 
. 
of  what  remains  an  evolving  work  in II.  SOMEPRINCIPLESOFTHE  FORMULATION 
As  our  agents  possess  incomplete  (and  in  particular  asymmetric)  information,  the  hypothesis 
of  complete  and  perfect  markets,  which  is  the  cornerstone  of  the  Arrow-Debreu  general 
equilibrium  framework,  is  rejected.3  Once  liberated  from  Arrow-Debreu  we  are  free  to 
emphasize  the  role  of  time  and  conditionality  in  the  economy.  Debt,  that  is  promises  made  at 
one  date  by  an  economic  unit  (firm,  household,  government  or  financial  institution)  to  pay  a 
certain  (or  contingent)  sum  of  money  to  specified  other  (or  bearer)  units  at  some  future  dates, 
provides  a natural  way  to  link  time  periods  for  capitalist  economies.4  Because,  in  the  aggregate, 
the  ability  of  units  to  fulfill  the  commitments  on  their  debts  depends  upon  the  endogenously 
determined  paths  of  profits  and  debts,  the  commitments  on  debts  may  or  may  not  be fulfilled. 
Debt  is  specialized  to  corporate  debt  to  banks:  the  liability  structure  sets  up  a time  series  of 
gross  cash  payments  that  corporations  must  pay  to  banks.  This  is  a  great  simplification  of  the 
debt  structure  of  modem  economies.  Household  and  government  debts,  as  well  as  a  complex 
layering  of debts,  exist  and  undoubtedly  affect  the  behavior  of  a modem  economy. 
In  the  following  we explore  the  complex  interrelations  of  financial  and  real  variables  with  the 
help  of  an  analytical  framework  that  is a simplified  (and  slightly  modified)  version  of  a class  of 
macrodynamic  models  published  elsewhere  (Delli  Gatti,  Gallegati,  and  Gardini,  1993  and  1994, 
Delli  Gatti  and  Gallegati,  1994)  which  have  been  extensively  analyzed  and  simulated  in order  to 
gain  new  insights  about  financially  determined  business  fluctuations.  A  model  per  se,  however, 
is nothing  else  than  a device  for  organizing  thoughts.  When  deemed  necessary,  our  description  of 
financial  developments  will  be richer  and  more  detailed  than  that  incorporated  into  the  model. 
In  macrodynamic  models  such  as  the  one  discussed  here,  we  can  obtain  a  wide  range  of 
different  dynamic  processes.  Depending  upon  the  parameter  configuration,  the  reduced  form  can 
yield  a  whole  array  of  time  paths,  ranging  from  oscillations  of  the  Slutsky-Frisch-Lucas  type, 
which  are  due  to  stochastic  disturbances  affecting  an  otherwise  non-oscillatory  framework,  to 
more  or  less  regular  endogenously  deter-tinned  wavelike  motion,  from  aperiodic  dynamics  to 
financial  instability  and  time  dependent  fluctuations.  The  actual  outcome  depends  not  only  upon the  behavior  of  firms,  households,  and  financial  institutions,  but  also  upon  the  structural 
characteristics  of the economy,  ruling parameters,  institutional  regime,  and policy  interventions, 
III. INSTITLJTIONALSTRUCTURE 
Schumpeter  characterized  the banker  as the ephor  of developing  capitalist  economies.  At an 
earlier  meeting  of  the  Schumpeter  Society,  Minsky  characterized  central  bankers  as the  “ephor 
of the ephors”  of capitalism  (Minsky,  1990).5 The difficulties  in getting  capitalism  well  started 
in  Eastern  Europe  centers  around  the  problems  of  developing  a  financial  system  in  societies 
where  there  are  no  significant  financial  institutions,  and  where  the  population  is  mainly  non 
numeric  in a financial  sense. 
The recognition  that  market  economies  are unstable  did not  wait  for  the demonstration  that 
complex  interactive  non-linear  equation  systems  can  yield  incoherent  or  turbulent  time  series. 
The  historic  experience  of  runaway  inflations  and  debt  deflations  served  as evidence  that  the 
behavior  of market  systems  is not necessarily  benevolent.  As capitalism  developed,  responsible 
policy  makers  always  took  Adam  Smith’s dictum  in regard  to  the  power  of  the  invisible  hand 
with the proverbial  grain of salt . 
One  of  the  most  evident  evils  of  the  market  economy  way  of  organizing  affairs  was  the 
periodic  eruption  of  financial  crises  followed  by hard  times.  To  contain  the  evils  that  market 
systems can inflict,  capitalist  economies  developed  sets of institutions  and authorities,  which  can 
be  characterized  as  the  equivalent  of  circuit  breakers.  These  institutions  in  effect  stop  the 
economic  processes  that  breed  the  incoherence,  and  restart  the  economy  with  new  initial 
conditions  and perhaps  with new reaction  coefficients. 
Even  though  there  are  many  devices  in  modem  capitalist  economies  that  constrain  and 
regulate  market  processes,  the  guidance  (;f the  economy  by  participating  in  and  constraining 
market  outcomes  is perhaps  most  evident  in  banking  systems  and  financial  markets.  Without 
going  into  details,  in  recent  years  we have  seen  various  effective  and  ineffective  central  bank “lender  of  last  resort”  interventions,  as well  as  some  interventions  that  can  be  best  interpreted  as 
government  equity  infusions  into  financial  institutions  to prevent  their  liabilities  from  falling  to a 
discount.6  The  deficits  that  big  governments  run,  minimum  wage  laws,  unemployment 
compensation,  and  government  sponsored  social  insurance  are  further  examples  of  devices  that 
do  not  permit  the  unconstrained  market  determination  of  economic  outcomes  but  set  boundary 
values  to  the  permissible  values  for  some  variables. 
In  the  non-linear  systems  that  can  breed  incoherence  there  are  terms  that  initially  have  a 
small  impact  upon  system  behavior,  but  which  accumulate  as  the  processes  “mature”.  As  the 
accumulating  variables  approach  critical  values,  incoherent  behavior  looms  as  a likely  outcome. 
Whether  such  an  incipient  incoherence  blossoms  into  realized  incoherence  depends  upon  the 
institutions,  regulations,  and  government  interventions  that  set  or  constrain  the  values  of 
economic  variables.7 
The  institutional  structure  at  any  date  reflects  legislation,  administrative  actions,  and  the 
evolution  of  institutions  and  usages  that  are due  to the  past  behavior  of  market  participants.*  The 
legislation  reflects  the  understanding  of  the  economy  (i.e.  the  maintained  economic  theory)  that 
ruled  among  the  policy  establishment  at  the  time  the  institutions  were  created.  Administrative 
interventions,  which  aim  to  steer  the  economy  or  to  contain  what  is  believed  to  be  incipient 
incoherent  behavior,  reflect  the  maintained  economic  theory  of  the  relevant  authorities  at  the 
time  they  intervene.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  two  sets  of  theories  can  be  markedly  different. 
The  institutions  could  have  been  set  in  place  when  the  policy  making  agents  of  the  economy 
believed  that  instability  verging  on  incoherence  is  an  inescapable  attribute  of  a  capitalist 
economy,  whereas  the  interventions  can  be  implemented  by  agents  who  believe  in  the  inherent 
stability  of capitalist  economies.9 
Thus  the  time  path  of  economic  variables  reflects  the  behavior  of  self-seeking  market  agents, 
the  impact  of  the  institutional  structur&  and  the  interventions  by  policy  authorities:  the 
interventions  reflect  a  maintained  economic  theory.  The  values  of  variables  that  the 
unconstrained  and  non-interventionist  economy  would  generate  are  replaced  by  values  that reflect  the immediate  impact  of interventions,  controls  and constraints:  what happens  reflects  the 
impact  of  the  economic  thinking  of  different  times.  Such  replacements  of  endogenously 
determined  variables,  which  are formally  equivalent  to the imposition  of  new initial  conditions, 
reset the dynamics  of the economy. 
Thus  initial  conditions  are  not  set once  and  for  all,  but  are  imposed  from  time  to  time  as 
institutional  usages  become  binding  or  the  authorities  react  to  their  view  of  the  state  of  the 
economy  and  its  future.  So  the  behavior  of  the  economy  depends  not  only  upon  endogenous 
dynamic  processes,  institutional  structures, and interventions  by the authorities,  but also upon the 
model of the economy  that guides the authorities. 
A  ruling  conjecture  that  follows  from  the  above  is  that  the  aptness  of  institutions  and 
interventions  will largely  determine  the extent  to which  the path of the economy  through  time is 
tranquil  or turbulent:  progressive,  stagnant, or deteriorating. 
IV.  THE  MODEL  STATED 
Our base model  is a closed  economy  with four types of agents: firms,  households,  banks, and 
governments.  Households  supply  labor  services,  demand  consumption  goods,  and  hold  bank 
liabilities  (demand  deposits).  Firms  supply  consumption  and  investment  goods,  and  demand 
labor  services,  investment  goods,  and bank  loans.  Banks  supply  their  liabilities  (deposits)  and 
demand  financial  assets (i.e. they supply loans). 
Fiscal  authorities  and  the  central  bank--which  we  lump  together  under  the  heading  of 
the”public  sector”  or  the  government--perform  the  duties  of  supplying  non  market  goods  and 
services,  underwrite  minimum  living  standards,  and  guarantee,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  select 
private  contracts.  Government  expenditures,  underwritings,  and  guarantees  are  paid  for  either 
through  tax collection,  by selling  government  bonds or by the issuance  of central  bank liabilities. 
There  are balance  sheet  as well as income  statement  relations  among  the units.  There  can be 
no balance  sheet  loose  ends  in analyzing  a capitalist  economy:  all financial  instruments  need  to appear  as  assets  on  one  balance  sheet  and  liabilities  on  another.  A  simplified  balance  sheet  is 
shown  in Table  1, where  the  symbol  “+” represents  assets,  while  “-” stands  for  liabilities. 
Table  I.  The balance  sheet structure of the economy 
Households*  Firms  Banks  Government” 
Deposits(+)  Deposits(-) 
Bank  equit.  (+)  Bank  equit.  (-) 
Coxpequit.  (+)  Corp.equit.  (-) 
Govbonds  (+>  Gov. bonds  (+)  Gov. bonds  (-) 
Loans  (-)  Loans  (+) 
Reserves  (+)  Reserves  (-) 
Wealth  (-)  Cap.  assets  (+) 
*The  present  value  of  tax  revenues  is  the  asset  side  of  the  government’s  balance  sheet  and  an 
implicit  liability  on  the  debit  side  of  households’  balance  sheets.  The  ability  of  popular 
governments  to  tax  to  support  the  funded  debts  and  unfunded  obligations  is the  main  issue  in  the 
crisis  of democratic  welfare  capitalism. 
We  postulate  three  markets:  labor,  credit,  and  goods.  We  do  not  deal  explicitly  with  the 
labor  market.  We  assume  that  employment  is a positive  function  of  effective  demand  at a given 
wage. 
There  is  no  stock  market.  Equity  investment  grows  by  means  of  retained  earnings.  Credit 
and  the  rate  of  interest  are  determined  in  the  loan  market.  The  price  level  is  constant  and 
normalized  to  unity:  no  distinction  can  be made  between  nominal  and  real  variables. 
There  are 9 equations  in our  basic  model. 
According  to the  Kalecki-Levy  equatiop,  gross  profits  (P) at time  t equals: 
(1)  I-I, =I,  +G where  I  is  gross  investment  and  G  is  gross  government  deficit,  which  in  our  simplified 
framework  coincides  with  gross  government  expenditure.  Heroically,  we  ignore  taxes  and 
interest  payments  on  public  debt.10  Therefore  we  can  specialize  on  the  impact  of  government 
deficit  on  gross  profits.  * 1 
In  this  paper,  current  investment  does  not  explicitly  contribute  to  future  capacity:  it  is  a 
component  of  aggregate  demand,  a determinant  of  profits  and  an  absorber  of  financing.  In other 
words  we  rule  out  any  capital  capacity  constraint  to output:  we  are  tracking  the  path  through  time 
of  gross  capital  income,  private  debt  and  the  interest  rate.  The  demand  for  investment  is:. 
(2)  1,  =  av,  +  b,IF, 
Equation  (2)  is  an  algebraic  statement  of  Figure  1,  a  graph  used  by  Minsky  (1975,  1982, 
1986)  to  explain  the  determination  of  investment.  v is  the  price  of  capital  assets--Minsky’s  P,-- 
and  IF is the  internal  finance,  to  be defined  in equation  (3). 
Since  the  price  of  current  output  (both  in  the  consumption  and  investment  goods  sectors,  by 
assumption)  is  constant  and  normalized  to  1, v can  be conceived  also  as the  ratio  of  the  price  of 
capital  assets  to  the  current  supply  price  of  investment  output,12  that  is,  “average  q”  in  Tobin’s 
terminology.  I3 
The  (non  negative)  parameter  “a”  reflects  the  sensitivity  of  investment  to  v,  the  current 
evaluation  of  capital  assets,  while  “b” reflects  the  extent  to which  firms  lever  retained  earnings  in 
the  financing  of  investment.  In  other  words,  b is a leveraging  ratio on  the  flow  of  equity  capital 
in the  form  of retained  earnings.14 
Internal  finance  available  at  time  t is  the  difference  between  lagged  profits  and  lagged  debt 
payments: 
(3)  IF,  = n,_,  -r,_,h, 
where  r  is  the  ratio  of  gross  payments  due  on  outstanding  debt  (interest  and  principal)  to  the 
stock  of  corporate  debt  (loans  extended  by ;he  banking  system).  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  in  the 
following  we  will  refer  to it as the  “interest  rate”. In  principle,  the  price  of  capital  assets  reflects  the  stream  of  expected  future  profits.  In  this 
paper  we  adopt  a simplifying  shortcut,  which  consists  in  representing  the  price  of  capital  assets 
by an  autoregressive  process:15 
(4)  v,  = v,_, + E, 
where  e is a random  variable  with  zero  mean  and  finite  variance.th 
The  propensity  to  lever  internal  funds  is  an  endogenous  variable. 
linear  increasing  function  of  profits  (Figure  2).t7 
(5)  b, = h,  + 6, arctg(II,_,) 
It  is  represented  as  a  non 
The  parameter  bo  represents  “liquidity  preference”  on  the  part  of  firms.  A decrease  in  b() can 
be  interpreted  as  an  increase  in  the  liquidity  preference  of  firms,  and  for  every  level  of  (lagged) 
profits  a fall  in b,  lowers  b. 
Informational  imperfections  on  capital  markets  (for  instance:  asymmetric  information  I*) 
imply  that  investment  is constrained  by  the  availability  of  external  finance.  We  assume  that  the 
supply  of  (external)  finance  on  the  part  of  banks,  F, is an increasing  function  of  the  interest  rate: 
(6)  F,  = Hr, 
The  parameter  H is assumed  to  be under  the control  of  monetary  authorities.  19 
The  demand  for  loans  equals  the  sum  of  corporate  debt  inherited  from  the  past  and  the 
financing  gap,  i.e.,  the  difference  between  total  investment  and  the  amount  financed  by  internal 
funds: 
(7)  D,  = D,_,  +11 -  IF, 
Loan  market  equilibrium  requires: 
(8)  D,  = F, 
From  equations  (6) and  equation  (8)  we derive  the  following  interest  rate  equation: 
In  principle,  present  views  of  the  fuiure  affect  current  investment  financing,  while  past 
financing  determines  payment  commitments  due  now.  The  willingness  and  the  ability  of  banks to  commit  their  funds  at  any  particular  time  depends  upon  the  perfomlance  of  the  assets  they 
own,  i.e.,  whether  commitments  made  in the  past  that  are  falling  due  today  are  being  honored. 
V.  THE REDUCED  FORM 
A modem  economy  has  to  be viewed  as a time-dependent  system  because  virtually  each  unit 
makes  financial  decisions  every  today  that  come  due  in  a myriad  of  tomorrows.  Such  decisions 
depend  upon  the  performance  of  the  economy  “now,”  the  current  status  of  financing  decisions 
made  in  the  past  that  are  maturing  today,  as  well  as  the  expected  performance  of  the  economy. 
Because  of  the  financing  connections  among  units,  a part  of  spending  is  prior  determined  by  the 
structure  of  liabilities.  For  debts  and  equity,  internal  finance,and  investment,  what  happens 
during  any  today  can  more  than  validate,  just  validate,  or  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  fail  to 
validate  decisions  made  in  the  past. 
Rational  agents  know  that  they  lack  perfect  foresight:  they  know  they  may  be  wrong.  This 
implies  that  their  willingness  to  accept  particular  types  of  assets  into  portfolios  or  particular 
types  of  funding  of  their  operations  is  subject  to  change  as  history  unfolds  evidence  that  their 
past  decisions  were  right  or  wrong.  When  past  investment  and  funding  decisions  are  strongly 
validated  by  current  and  past  outcomes,  then  the  belief  in  the  model  of  the  economy  that  guides 
the  decisions  of  potential  debtors  and  asset-holding  financing  agencies  is  reinforced.  When 
decisions  taken  in  the  past  are  being  barely  validated  currently,  then  either  no  revision  or  minor 
changes  of  the  belief  in  the  model  that  guided  past  actions  take  place.  When  current  cash  flows 
are  insufficient  to  validate  decisions  taken  in  the  past,  then  the  model  that  guided  behavior  is 
abandoned  and  defensive  steps  are  taken  by  firms,  financiers,  and  the  ultimate  owners  of 
financial  assets  to contain  the  damage  from  their  errors. 
We  study  the  behavior  of  three  fundamental  relations  in  a view  of  the  economy  that  focuses 
upon  profits,  debts,  and  the  cost  of  carrying  debts,  that  is,  the  interest  rate. 
Substituting  equations  (2)  and  (4) into  equation  (1) gives  us  the  following  profit  equation: (10)  fl, =a,_,  +uq+h,lF,+G 
Other  things  being  equal,  an  increase  in  the  leveraging  ratio  increases  investment  and  leads 
to an  increase  in  profits. 
Substituting  equations  (2) and  (4)  into  (7), we  get  the  debt  equation: 
(11)  D,  = Q-1  + [a\‘,_, + UE, + (h,  -  l)IF,] 
The  dynamic  behavior  of  the  interest  rate  is  linked  to  that  of  corporate  debt,  as  shown  by 
equation  (9)  above.  We  are  now  ready  to  derive  the  reduced  form  of  the  system.  Substituting 
equations  (3) and  (9) into  (10)  and  (1 l),  we  get: 
l-4  =  a +  b,IT,_,  - LD,_,’  +  G 
H 
D, = D,_,  + a +(b,  -  On,_, 
h  -1 
(11’) 
_‘-D  2 
H 
1-l 
where  a=avt  is treated  as an exogenous  variable  and  b is represented  by equation  (S).The  system 
of  equations  (lO’)(l  1’) is characterized  by  two  non-linearities:  it is obviously  non-linear  in  D,  but 
it is  also  non-linear  in  P  thanks  to  the  interaction  of  the  leveraging  ratio--an  increasing  function 
of the  profit  level--and  internal  finance. 
Systems  of  two  non-linear  difference  equations  of  this  type  have  been  studied  extensively 
elsewhere  (see  in particular  Delli  Gatti,  Gallegati,  and  Gardini,  1993,  1994).  The  procedure  is  as 
follows.  First  of  all,  we  compute  the  steady  state  of  the  system  and  assess  its  stability 
properties,  treating  b as a given  parameter.  The  steady  state  is as follows: 
n*=G+a 
I-h 
D’  =m 
Then  we  simulate  the  model,  allowing  for  the  non-linearity  induced  by  equation  (5).  Figure  3 
illustrates  how  changes  in  b,  as determined  by  equation  (5),  affect  the  dynamic  properties  of  the 
system. 
A relatively  “low”  value  of  b (that  is, cvalue  of  b smaller  than  a critical  (lower)  crucial  level 
bH)  leads  to  a  monotonically  or  cyclically  damped  time  series,  converging  to  the  steady  state. 
On  the  contrary,  a relatively  “high”  value  of  b (that  is,  a value  of  b greater  than  a critical  (upper) crucial  level  b”)  leads  to  a monotonically  or cyclically  explosive  time  series.  Between  bH  and 
bM the  time  series  that  are  generated  evolve  from  bounded  cycles  to  (purely  deterministic  or 
stochastic)  chaotic  behavior.20 
In figure  4 a (bounded)  cycle--a  closed  orbit--is  depicted  as reproduced  by our  simulation. 
We  can  begin  our  examination  in the  second  half  of quadrant  (i),  where  debts  are  falling  even 
as  profits  are  rising.  This  is  a  period  of  tranquil  expansion,  during  which  entrepreneurs  are 
pleasantly  surprised  by  actual  profits  exceeding  their  anticipations  of  profits.  In  quadrant  (ii) 
debts  rise,  but  through  most  of  this  phase  profits  rise  even  faster.  At  the  transition  from  quadrant 
(ii)  to  quadrant  (iii)  profits  stop  increasing  even  as  debts  virtually  explode.  In  quadrant  (iii) 
debts  continue  to rise  even  as profits  begin  to fall:  the  financial  structure  becomes  fragile.  At  the 
transition  from  quadrant  (iii)  to  quadrant  (iv)  debts  begin  to  fall  even  as  profits  continue  to 
decline.  In  quadrant  (iv)  both  profits  and  debts  fall.  At  the  transition  between  quadrants  (iv)  and 
(i)  the  fall  of  profits  stops,  but  the  fall  of  debts  could  very  well  be  the  almost  vertical  drop  of  a 
debt  deflation.  In  our  model  profits  are  sustained  by  government  deficit--in  a modern  society, 
government  deficit  can  be  expected  to  increase  as  a  debt  deflation  threatens21  With  the 
transition  to  quadrant  (i)  the  debt  decrease  begins  to  taper  off  and  profits  begin  to increase.  The 
transition  from  a fragile  to a robust  financial  system  begins  again. 
Figure  5 is an  alternative  diagram  of  the  processes  represented  in Figure  4. 
During  an  initial  or  recovery  period,  profits  are  rising  relative  to  debts  and  financial  markets 
are  slack:  interest  rates  are  falling.  In  the  second  phase,  profits  rise  relative  to  debts  and  interest 
rates  fii.  During  the  third  stage  of  the  cycle,  even  as  profits  taper  off  and  then  begin  to  fall 
precipitously,  debts  rise  and  then  explode.  Interest  rates  may  peak  in  a refinancing  crisis.  Debts 
are  viewed  as  excessive,  and  a  burst  of  non  performing  capital  and  financial  assets  appears. 
Whether  or  not  a full-fledged  deflation  takes  place  depends  upon  the  institutional  structure  and 
. 
the  aptness  of interventions. Figure  6  shows  a  closed  orbit  on  the  (P,D)  plane,  analogous  to  that  of  Figure  4  and  two 
ceilings,  a maximum  debt-profit  ratio  (D’) and  full  employment  (P’), and  one  floor  to  profits  as 
set by  the  government  deficit  (PG). 
The  combination  of  the  maximum  debt-profit  ratio  and  the  floor  to  profits  decreases  the 
likelihood  of  a debt  deflation  and  accompanying  turbulence:  the  likelihood  of  an  overshoot  on 
the  downside  decreases.  On  the  other  hand,  if  financing  ceilings  prevent  the  exploitation  of 
seemingly  profitable  opportunities,  profit  seeking  agents  will  develop  innovative  financing 
techniques,  which  often  catch  central  bankers  asleep  at the  switch.  The  fragility  of  the  financial 
system  that  results  from  the  new  ways  can  “force”  central  banks  to  ease  their  restrictions  on 
available  financing  (Minsky,  1957b).  Fiscal  policy  measures  are  also  ways  to  contain  debt 
deflations  by  supporting  aggregate  profits. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  approach  to  business  cycles  and  macroeconomic  dynamics  adopted  here  holds  that  the 
path  of  a capitalist  economy  through  calendar  time  cannot  be reduced  to  a dynamic  process  that 
started  far  in  the  past  and  will  continue  for  the  foreseeable  future.  This  is  so because  the  market 
processes  that  determine  investment,  employment,  income,  consumption,  the  composition  of 
portfolios,  and  the  myriad  of  individual  prices  and  quantities  take  place  within  an  institutional 
structure,  which  limits  the  movement  and  values  of  some  of  the  variables  of  the  system. 
Whenever  such  institutionally  determined  values  dominate  the  endogenously  determined  values 
in  what  actually  occurs,  then  the  path  of  the  economy,  the  ongoing  dynamic  process,  is  broken, 
and  an interactive  process,  which  starts  with  new  initial  conditions,  generates  future  values. 
In  particular,  whenever  the  economy  behaves  or  even  threatens  to  behave  in  an  incoherent 
way,  “stabilizers”,  which  may  be built  in o? require  actions  by  authorities,  kick  in  and  prevent  the 
economy  from  continuing  on  the  prior  endogenously  determined  dynamic  path.  At  these  times 
prior  dynamic  processes  are  superseded  by  a new  process  characterized  by  a combination  of  new initial  conditions  and  new  reaction  coefficients.  This  new  process  will  have  its run  in the  context 
of  a  new  institutional  structure  which  incorporates  market  adjustments  and  regulatory  and 
legislative  initiatives  that  were  responses  to the  “crisis”. 
One  of  the  advances  in this  paper  is that  b, the  leveraging  ratio,  which  plays  a role  analogous 
to  the  accelerator  coefficient  of  the  multiplier  accelerator  models,  is  an  endogenous  variable. 
Swings  in  b can  be  interpreted  as  what  Keynes  characterized  as  changes  in  liquidity  preference 
on  the  part  of  firms.  The  ability  of  a  businessman  to  finance  investment,  i.e.,  to  become  less 
liquid,  requires  a parallel  willingness  of  the  “external”  financier  to  become  less  liquid.  There  is a 
type  of  self-fulfilling  prophecy  in  the  swings  of  liquidity  preference.  Cash  flows,  in  the  form  of 
increased  gross  profits,  accrue  to  business  as  financed  investment  increases,  and  cash  flows  to 
business,  in  the  form  of  aggregate  profits,  decrease  when  some  real  or  financial  asset  fails  to 
perform,  which  leads  to  a  shift  towards  an  increase  in  desired  liquidity  by  bankers,  portfolio 
managers,  and  businessmen. 
In  Figure  1, which  is  a representation  of  equation  (2),  the  leverage  is determined  by  the  way 
in  which  the  external  financing  line  falls  away  from  the  capital  asset  price  line  and  the  way  the 
external  financing  line  rises  from  the  current  price  line.  The  first  represents  the  reluctance  of  the 
firm  to lever,  and  the  second  the  reluctance  of  the  “bankers”  to lend.  Such  “risk”  assessments  are 
among  the  main  drivers  of  capitalist  economies,  and  their  current  status  at any  time  reflects  how 
the  past  of  the  economy  affects  bankers  and  businessmen.  It  is  the  combined  animal  spirits  of 
bankers  and  businessmen  that  determine  what  in  fact  happens. 
One  simple  assertion--that  investment  has  to  be  financed  either  by  capitalist  retained  profits 
or  by  external  funds--has  profound  effects  in  making  our  model  both  time-dependent  and  non- 
linear.  This  opens  a rich  menu  of  possible  system  behaviors,  even  though  we  greatly  simplified 
the  financing  relations:  debt  financing  was  by banks,  and  we  really  did  not  allow  much  influence 
to bank  liabilities. 
. 
We  assumed  that  the  government  deficit  equals  government  spending,  and  we  kept  it 
constant  throughout  the  exercise.  This,  of  course,  has  the  consequence  that  government spending  becomes  an  increasingly  large  (small)  factor  determining  profits  as  investment  falls 
(rises),  but  not  to  the  same  extent  that  would  have  been  true  if  we  had  modeled  contracyclical 
fiscal  policy.  Endogenizing  tax  revenues  and  government  expenditures  is  an  obvious  extension 
of  the  work.  Our  intuition  is  that  instead  of  only  one  ephor  in  banking  that  guides  and  directes 
the  economy,  there  are  at  least  two  of  them,  because  fiscal  policy  provides  a  second  ephor 
complimentary  to the  banking  one. 
To  a large  extent  the  45  years  since  Schumpeter  died  have  been  dominated  by  the  results  of 
Arrow  and  Debreu.  We  now  are  more  aware  of  the  limited  applicability  of  general  equilibrium 
theory  than  hitherto  in  the  Arrow-Debreu  era.  We  know  that  the  results  were  based  upon  not 
only  heroic  but  also  profoundly  unacceptable  assumptions:  utility  functions  over  the  reals  and 
perfect  foresight  being  two  that  are especially  foreign  to modem  capitalist  economies. 
One  implication  of  Schumpeter’s  Theory  of Economic  Development  is  that  the  analysis  of 
capitalist  economic  processes  will  not  lead  to  the  relegation  of  money,  credit,  and  finance  to  a 
pound  of  details  that  are  irrelevant  for  an  understanding  of  the  fundamental  rules  of  capitalism. 
The  monetary  and  financial  structures  provide  not  only  an essential  set  of  links  between  the  past, 
the  present,  and  the  future,  but  they  also  provide  the  economy  with  some  of  its  most  important 
aborters  of  incoherence.  The  dominating  functions  of  central  banking,  deposit  insurance,  and 
fiscal  policy  are  to  sustain  asset  values  and  aggregate  profits,  and  thus  contain  any  thrust  of  the 
economy  towards  the  incoherence  of  a  deep  debt  deflation  and  depression.  Schumpeter  was 
never  more  relevant  than  when  he  identified  bankers  as  the  ephor  of  capitalist  economies.  In 
modern  capitalism  the  central  bank  and  the  fiscal  powers  of  governments  are,  so  to  speak,  the 
ephors  of  the  ephors  of  capitalism. 
Thus  the  Schumpeterian  monetary 
Keynes’s  monetary  production  economy 
production  innovative  economy  is  a  rich  version  of 
(Keynes,  1933).  This  economy  is a maze  of  cash  flows, 
production  is  always  an  MX>M’  phenom&on--to  use  Marx’s  terminology--and  profits  exist  not 
because  capital  assets  are  productive  but  because  the  composition  of  aggregate  demand  makes 
capital  assets  scarce. 22 Furthermore  part  of  M is from  and  part  of  M’ is to bankers. Now  that  it is agreed  that  for  the  foreseeable  future  the  world  economy  will  be dominated  by 
a set of  financially  complex  capitalist  economies,  economists  should  turn  from  the  contemplation 
of  abstract  economies  to  the  study  of  the  behavior  of innovative  monetary  production  economies. 
A marriage,  not  of  convenience  but  of  the  shared  insights,  between  the  economics  of  Keynes  and 
of  Schumpeter  seems  to  be a fruitful  program  for  research. Notes 
1.  Our taking-off  point  is that  the  accelerator  and marginal  propensity  to consume  coefficients 
are  economic  variables.  In  particular  we model  the  economic  determinants  of  the  investment 
coefficient.  We  find  ample  reasons  to  believe  that  the  resulting  volatility  of  the  investment 
coefficient  leads to incoherent  behavior  in a system where investment  determines  profits,  and the 
financing  of  investment  prior  commits  future  profit  flows  to the  servicing  of  liabilities. 
2.  In  the  special  case,  where  the  ceiling’s  rate  of  change  is  less  than  the  smaller  of  the  two 
positive  real  roots  that  generate  the  explosive  series  (these  roots  are  transformations  of  the 
accelerator  and  multiplier  coefficients),  the  new  initial  conditions  lead  to  a  small  negative 
coefficient  for the larger (major) root and a large positive  coefftcient  for the smaller  (minor)  root. 
As  a result,  the  dynamic  process  begins  by  generating  an  increasing  income  but,  as the  large 
major  root  with  its negative  coefficient  takes over, the rate of increase  of income  first decreases 
and then becomes  negative:  the income generated  decreases.  A setup which has two positive  real 
roots  can,  with  appropriate  initial  conditions,  generate  one  turning  point:  the  business  cycle 
results  from  the  system  bouncing  between  “floors”  and  “ceilings.” 
3.  Since information  is asymmetric,  agents differ one from another  (Stiglitz,  1992), and therefore 
the representative  agent  assumption  is not  valid.  Macroeconomic  models  cannot  be built  upon 
a representative  agent  microfoundation  (Kirman,  1992). 
4.  This  also implies  that we cannot  get meaningful  results by abstracting  from  financial  markets 
and then  adding  money  or finance  to the model.  Note that,  as debts are of private  units,  there 
is no  certainty  that  commitments  will  be fulfilled.  Also  note  that among  the proximate  holders 
of debts are banks:  this  implies  that non  fulfillment  of debt contracts  compromises  the liquidity 
of the  economy. 
Fulfillment  of  private,  and  even  public,  debts  is  contingent  upon  outcomes  whose 
likelihood  cannot be known.  Once the Arrow-Debreu  hypothesis  of complete  and perfect markets 
is rejected,  the  world  becomes  Keynesian  in that  intractable  uncertainty  exists. 
5.  Ephors  were  elected  magistrates  of  Sparta whose  function  was to keep  the kings  in  line. 
6.  In the United  States, the so called bailout  of Savings and Loan Associations,  as well as many‘ 
commercial  banks,  is an instance  of an eq$y  infusion.  Similar  refinancings,  perhaps  not  at the 
same  scale  and  perhaps  without  similar  systemic  causes,  took  place  in  almost  all  advanced 
capitalist  economies. 7. .  As  interventions  set  off  interactive  processes  with  new  initial  conditions,  the  outcome 
depends  upon  interventions  that  occur  at different  dates.  Thus  the  outcome,  as determined  by 
endogenous  forces and the resetting  of the process with new initial  conditions,  is time-dependent. 
8.  See Minsky  (1957)  for an application  of these ideas to the interrelations  between  banks  and 
central  banks  in determining  the  evolution  of banking  practices. 
9.  The  legislation  of  1935-36,  which  set up the basic  structure  of the  financial  system  for  the 
United  States,  was strongly  affected  by ideas that  held  that breakdowns  are  “normal”  outcomes 
of  “laissez  faire”  capitalism,  whereas  the  various  monetarisms,  which  influenced  policy  and 
institution  building  over  the  past  two  decades,  are  based  upon  the  assumptions  that  market 
capitalisms,  even intensely  financial  variants,  are inherently  stable and seek out an outcome  that 
can be characterized  as optimal. 
10. An  obvious  extension  consists  in endogenizing  taxes  and introducing  a government  budget 
constraint.  This  is left  to future  developments  of our research  project. 
11.  Schumpeter’s  view  that  in the  absence of investment  profits  are zero  is consistent  with  the 
Kalecki-Levy  equations  after  allowing  that  the  impact  upon  profits  of  government  deficits  is 
equivalent  to that  of financed  investment.  As a “Walrasian” he had difficulty  in explaining  this 
view. 
Perhaps  the most  difficult  of the Keynes,  Kalecki,  Levy,  and Schumpeter  views  to get across to 
a  modern  economist  is  that  capital  is  a  value  term:  it  is  the  value  placed  upon  the  current 
expectations  of mainly  future  income  flows. 
12. Since the price  level  of capital  assets and the price  level  of investment  output  are determined 
by  different  sets of variables,  we expect  them  to behave  differently:  in particular  the  former  is‘ 
expected  to  be more  volatile  than  the  latter  (Minsky,  1975).  For  investment  to take  place,  the 
expected  cash flows  from  operating  investment  outputs  as capital  assets has to service  liabilities 
that reflect  what  was paid  for the investment:  an implication  of this  is v>l . 13.  Tobin  (1989) believes  Minsky’s  theory  of investment  to be indistinguishable  from  his own. 
As  has  been  correctly  pointed  out  by  Dymski  and  Pollin  (1992),  Minsky’s  theory  differ  with 
Tobin’s  because  he  assumes  the presence  of private  information,  which  means  the Modigliani- 
Miller  theorem  cannot  be applied. 
Abel and Blanchard  (1986) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) show that internal  finance 
plays  a central  role  in  investment  activity  on the  assumption  that  alternative  sources  of  finance 
are not perfect  substitutes:  in an environment  of asymmetric  information,  a financing  hierarchy 
that  ranges  from  internal  funds  to  various  types  of  external  funds  emerges.  One  difference 
between  internal  and  external  finance  is  that  internal  funds  do  not  lead  to  a  legal  binding 
commitment  of  future  cash payments.  Managements  may  feel  committed  to paying  dividends, 
but in principle  and in practice  dividends  depend upon the realization  of profits.  In the hierarchy 
of  hedge,  speculative,  and  Ponzi  finance,  the  greater  the  ratio  of  equity  to  debt  financing  the 
greater  the  chance  that  the  firm  will  be  a hedge  financing  unit.  Note  that  Ponzi  finance,  the 
capitalizing  of interest,  involves  an increase  in indebtedness  equal to the decrease  in equity.  By 
compromising  the  equity  base of  an organization,  Ponzi  financing  increases  the  likelihood  that 
future  Ponzi  financing  will  occur. 
14.  An investment  equation  such as (2), already present -- albeit  implicitly  -- in Minsky’s  works, 
has been put  forward  by the authors  in Delli  Gatti  and Gallegati  (1990).  Since  then  it has been 
repeatedly  used  in  different  versions  of  the  prototype  framework  (Delli  Gatti  and  Gallegati, 
1992,  1994 and  Delli  Gatti,  Gallegati,  and  Gardini,  1993,  1994).  The  empirical  literature  on 
functional  forms of this type  starts with  Fazzari, Hubbard,  and Petersen  (1988).  For a survey  of 
the literature  on the econometric  implementation  of investment  equations  see Chirinko  (1994). 
15. This  specification  is  consistent  with  empirical  results  found  by  Blanchard  et  al.  (1990), 
according  to which  average  Q is a white  noise  random  process. 
16.  Laibson  and Friedman  (1989) model  capital  asset prices  as a Poisson  distribution  where the 
heights  of  the  tails  are  positively  related  to the  debt-income  ratio.  As  a result,  crashes  in  the 
stock  market  and  in  the  market  valuation  of  firms  become  more  likely  as the  fragility  of  the 
financial  structure  increases. 
Equation  (4)  evades  the  issue  of how  expected  future  profits  are  transformed  into  the  implicit 
price  for  capital  assets.  In  the modem  capitalist  economies,  capital  assets are usually,  but  not 
always,  transferred  from  one  owner  to  another  as a packet  of  assets  combined  with  a market- 
position.  The transformation  of  such prices,  which  include  a valuation  of market  position,  into 
Minsky’s  Pk and  Tobin’s  Q is an open  q,uestion. 17.  A pro-cyclical  propensity  to invest, or leveraging  ratio,  can be explained  by a “composition 
effect”.  According  to  Fazzari’s  empirical  investigation,  small  firms  are  characterized  by  small 
capital  stock,  high  sales and capital  growth  rates, a high  retention  rate,  and a high  propensity  to 
invest  out of internal  finance.  Just the opposite  is true for relatively  large firms. As the aggregate 
propensity  to invest  is a weighted  average of the propensities  to invest  of small  and large  firms, 
with  weights  equal  to  the  share  of  the  total  cash  flow  generated  by  small  and  large  firms 
respectively,  when  the population  of  small  firms  increases  during  the  stage of the  expansion  of 
business  cycles,  the propensity  to invest  by  leveraging  internally  generated  funds  increases. 
18. Keynes‘s  and Kalecki’s  notions  of borrowers’ risk and lender’s risk -- which are incorporated 
into  Minsky’s  diagrammatic  representation  of investment  determination  -- can be interpreted  as 
informational  imperfections  in an asymmetric  information  framework. 
19.  The  Schumpeterian  (and  Keynesian)  tradition,  to  which  we adhere,  views  money  as both 
endogenous  and  with  an evolving  composition.  This  is a simplifying  assumption,  which  needs 
to be lifted  as this  program  advances.  See Minsky  (1957b). 
20. A stochastic disturbance  affects investment  through the autoregressive  process that determines 
the price  of  capital  assets. 
21.  Furthermore,  as we just  saw in the United  States, the  government  may  take  responsibility 
for  assuring  that bank  and  near-bank  liabilities  are sustained  at par. 
22.  To  Schumpeter,  Keynes,  Kalecki,  and  Jerome  Levy,  profits  are  determined  by  the 
composition  of  financed  demand,  not  by any technical  productivity  of  capital  assets.  They  are 
closer  to  the  Marshallian  view,  that  profit  income  is  a quasi  rent,  than  to  the  “modem”  view, 
which  assurnes  that  a marginal  product  of  capital  is  a meaningful  concept,  so that  profits  are 
determined  by the  technical  conditions  of production. 
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